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RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
In 2005, Darryl Orrin Baker, proceeding pro se, filed a 
federal lawsuit against the United States and various officials 
of the McKean Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI-
McKean”), alleging personal injuries caused by their 
exposing him to second-hand smoke while he was 
incarcerated at that facility in 2004, in violation of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671.  The District Court 
dismissed his case, but, as is discussed at length below, news 
of the dismissal did not reach Baker for quite some time.  His 
efforts to rectify the situation created by the late notice were, 
as a result, untimely. 
Baker appeals the District Court‟s orders denying his 
untimely motions to reopen the time to take an appeal and his 
untimely motions for reconsideration of the prior order 
dismissing his complaint.  He contends that his motions were 
untimely because prison officials delayed in transmitting to 
him the District Court‟s dismissal order.  He urges that 
because of the delay, we should either rule that the District 
Court can consider reopening the time to take an appeal, or 
should deem his motion for reconsideration timely, which 
would enable us to review the underlying dismissal order.   
For the reasons set forth below, we hold that we cannot 
relax the timing requirements for filing a motion to reopen the 
time to take an appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 4(a)(6), even for prison delay, because those 
timing requirements are governed by a statute and are 
jurisdictional in nature.  Furthermore, while prison delay may 
make an untimely motion for reconsideration timely so as to 
permit us to exercise appellate jurisdiction over an order we 
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would otherwise lack jurisdiction to review, the delays Baker 
complains of were not caused by prison officials, and 
therefore, his untimely motions for reconsideration do not 
permit us to review the underlying dismissal order. 
I.  Background and Procedural History 
When Baker filed his complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, he 
was incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in 
Lisbon, Ohio (“FCI-Lisbon”).  While his case was proceeding 
in the District Court in 2005, Baker was transferred from FCI-
Lisbon to the Lewisburg United States Penitentiary (“USP-
Lewisburg”).   
The District Court entered an order on July 11, 2006 
granting the defendants‟ motion to dismiss (the “Dismissal 
Order”), and sent notice of the dismissal to Baker and the 
defendants.  Unfortunately, the District Court clerk‟s office 
sent the Dismissal Order to Baker‟s address at FCI-Lisbon, 
the address then listed on the docket sheet, instead of USP-
Lewisburg.
1
  (Amicus App. at 273.)  An internal docket entry 
dated July 24, 2006 confirms that Baker did not receive a 
copy of the order.  The entry states, “***Staff notes; Order 
dated 7/11/06 returned from Darryl Orrin Baker; envelope 
marked „Not at this address; Return to Sender.‟”  (Id. at 274.)  
It appears that the clerk‟s office did not make any effort to 
                                              
1
 Although the docket sheet refers to Baker‟s place of 
incarceration as “FCI-Lisbon,” the only federal prison in 
Lisbon, Ohio is actually called “FCI-Elkton.”  There is no 
federal prison that is called “FCI-Lisbon.”  We refer to the 
prison as such, however, in order to be consistent with the 
record. 
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locate Baker after the copy of the order was returned.  
Unfortunately for Baker, this was just the beginning of a 
series of missteps that gave rise to the procedural puzzle 
presented in this appeal.   
The next docket activity occurred nearly seven months 
later, in February 2007.  The first docket entry dated February 
9, 2007 is a change-of-address notice from Baker.  Baker had 
written a letter to the District Court dated December 28, 2005, 
notifying the clerk‟s office of his move from FCI-Lisbon to 
USP-Lewisburg and providing a new mailing address.  
However, the clerk‟s office did not docket the letter or enter 
his address change on the docket until February 9, 2007, more 
than a year after Baker had sent his notice.  The second 
docket entry on February 9, 2007 reflects that Baker sent a 
letter to the District Court dated January 31, 2007, in which 
he explained that he had obtained a copy of the docket sheet 
in his case and learned from it that the District Court issued 
the Dismissal Order.  Baker asserted that he never received a 
copy of the Dismissal Order, and as a result, had been unable 
to file a motion for reconsideration or a notice of appeal.  
Baker asked the clerk‟s office to provide him with a copy of 
the Dismissal Order.  The clerk‟s office did so, but not until 
eleven months later, on January 7, 2008. 
In the meantime, on May 31, 2007, Baker filed
2
 
several motions:  a post-judgment motion under Federal Rule 
                                              
2
 Baker signed these motions on May 31, 2007, and they were 
entered on the District Court docket on June 8, 2007.  We 
presume here that Baker filed all of his motions on the date 
that he executed them.  See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 
276 (1988) (deeming a notice of appeal filed “at the time 
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of Civil Procedure 60(b); a motion to file a notice of appeal 
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1);
3
 a motion 
to toll the time to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 
4(a)(4); and a motion to reopen the time to take an appeal 
under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).  Then, as noted above, on 
January 7, 2008, nearly a year after Baker requested it, Baker 
was served with a copy of the Dismissal Order.  Baker then 
supplemented his May 31, 2007 motions on January 16, 2008 
by filing a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 
59(e).  In all of these motions, Baker alleged that the prison 
was responsible for his not receiving a copy of the Dismissal 
Order, averring generally that staff at USP-Lewisburg 
mishandled his mail by returning a copy of the Dismissal 
Order to the District Court.  This error, Baker contended, 
prevented him from filing timely post-judgment motions and 
a timely notice of appeal from the Dismissal Order.   
On January 31, 2008, the District Court denied all of 
Baker‟s motions.  First, the District Court construed all of 
Baker‟s motions under Appellate Rule 4 as motions to reopen 
the time to take an appeal, pursuant to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).  
The District Court explained that it was barred from 
reopening Baker‟s time to file a notice of appeal because 
Baker‟s motion was not filed within the earlier of 180 days 
after the judgment was entered or within seven days of his 
receiving notice of the entry, as then-required by Appellate 
                                                                                                     
petitioner delivered it to the prison authorities for forwarding 
to the court clerk”).   
 
3
 We will refer to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as 
“Rules,” and use the short-hand “Appellate Rule” when 
referring to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
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Rule 4(a)(6)(B).
4
  Next, the District Court denied Baker‟s 
motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) as untimely 
because Baker failed to file that motion within ten days of the 
Dismissal Order, as then required under Rule 59(e).
5
  The 
District Court also denied Baker‟s Rule 60(b) motion, but that 
is not at issue on appeal. 
On February 9, 2008, Baker filed another motion for 
reconsideration under Rule 59(e).  In that motion, Baker 
asserted that the District Court erred in denying his first 
motion for reconsideration because it failed to consider in that 
denial order that prison authorities mishandled the delivery of 
the Dismissal Order.  At the same time, Baker also filed 
another motion to reopen the time to take an appeal.  The 
District Court denied these motions on April 10, 2008.  As to 
Baker‟s attempts to reopen the time to take an appeal, the 
                                              
4
 Currently, a motion to reopen the time to take an appeal 
must be filed within the earlier of 180 days after the judgment 
was entered or fourteen days of receiving notice of the entry.  
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(B).  However, at the time Baker‟s 
case was before the District Court, a litigant had to file his 
motion to reopen within the earlier of 180 days after the 
judgment was entered or seven days of receiving notice of the 
entry.  Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)(B) (2007).  Amendments in 
2009 to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) changed the seven-day time 
limit to fourteen days. 
 
5
 Currently, a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) 
must filed no later than twenty-eight days after the entry of 
the judgment.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e).  However, at the time 
Baker‟s case was before the District Court, a ten-day deadline 
applied.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (2007).   
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District Court reaffirmed its previous ruling that Appellate 
Rule 4(a)(6) sets a 180-day outer limit on such an attempt.  
As to Baker‟s Rule 59(e) motion, the District Court rejected 
Baker‟s argument that it needed to hold an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether prison officials actually 
interfered with the delivery of his mail, believing that our 
opinion in Poole v. Family Court of New Castle County, 368 
F.3d 263, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2004), barred exclusion of delay 
caused by prison officials from time limits for filing an appeal 
in civil cases.
6
 
Baker timely appealed the District Court‟s January 31, 
2008 and April 10, 2008 orders.  We consolidated Baker‟s 
appeals with three other cases — Barner v. Williamson, et al., 
No. 08-1025, Long v. Atlantic City Police Department, et al., 
No. 06-4732, and Cycle Chem, Inc. v. Jackson, et al., No. 09-
1320 — that also concern the timeliness of appeals under 
Appellate Rule 4(a).
7
      
                                              
6
 As we discuss below and in a companion case filed today, 
Long v. Atlantic City Police Department, No. 06-4732, some 
of our reasoning in Poole, upon which the District Court 
relied, was mistaken.  However, our ultimate ruling was 
correct. 
 
7
 We appointed Fine, Kaplan and Black, R.P.C. as amicus on 
behalf of the Court to brief the jurisdictional issues in the 
cases.  Because Baker, Barner, and Long are all appearing pro 
se, we also appointed Dechert LLP as pro bono counsel to 
represent them solely on the jurisdictional issues presented in 
the appeals.
 
 The Court greatly appreciates the assistance 
provided by amicus and pro bono counsel in these cases.  We 
are issuing separate opinions in each of the cases. 
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II.  Discussion 
Baker‟s appeals raise two issues, each of which 
concerns a separate rule of appellate procedure.  The first 
rule, Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), concerns a district court‟s ability 
to reopen the time to file an appeal.  It states: 
The district court may reopen the time to file an 
appeal for a period of 14 days after the date 
when its order to reopen is entered, but only if 
all the following conditions are satisfied: 
(A) the court finds that the moving party did not 
receive notice under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 77 (d) of the entry of the judgment or 
order sought to be appealed within 21 days after 
entry; 
(B) the motion is filed within 180 days after the 
judgment or order is entered or within 14 days 
after the moving party receives notice under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77 (d) of the 
entry, whichever is earlier; and 
(C) the court finds that no party would be 
prejudiced. 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).  The second rule at issue is Appellate 
Rule 4(a)(4).  That rule states, in pertinent part:   
(A) If a party timely files in the district court 
any of the following motions under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, the time to file an 
appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the 
10 
 
order disposing of the last such remaining 
motion: 
. . .  
(iv) to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 
59; 
 . . . . 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).  Thus, the timely filing of a Rule 59 
motion tolls the time to appeal the underlying order until the 
district court rules on the Rule 59 motion. 
The first issue before us is whether the District Court 
erred in denying Baker‟s various attempts to reopen the time 
to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).  Baker argues 
that his motions to reopen should have been granted because, 
in calculating the time during which one may move to reopen, 
courts should exclude any delay attributable to prison 
authorities.  Under Baker‟s view of the rule, the District Court 
should have started counting his time to reopen from January 
7, 2008, the date he received a copy of the Dismissal Order.  
If the District Court thus erred in denying Baker‟s motions to 
reopen, we would reverse and remand with instructions to the 
District Court to evaluate whether Baker‟s allegation of 
prison delay may be credited such that his motion to reopen 
could be granted, which might ultimately provide Baker the 
opportunity to file a timely notice of appeal that would bring 
up the Dismissal Order for appellate review.  However, if the 
District Court was correct in denying Baker‟s motions, then 
the appeal from the Dismissal Order would be barred unless 
his motion for reconsideration was timely.   
11 
 
Thus, the second question presented is whether we 
may deem his motions for reconsideration timely due to his 
allegations of delay caused by prison officials in delivering 
the Dismissal Order to him; doing so would toll Baker‟s time 
to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).  If the 
answer to that question is yes, then we would have 
jurisdiction over the appeal from the Dismissal Order, as well 
as from the January 31, 2008 and April 10, 2008 orders 
denying the various post-judgment motions.  If the answer to 
that question is no, then we would have jurisdiction only over 
the appeals from the January 31, 2008 and April 10, 2008 
orders denying his motions for reconsideration.  
A. Reopening the Time to File an Appeal Under 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) 
As noted above, after learning in February 2007 that 
the District Court had entered the Dismissal Order, Baker 
filed various motions, all of which the District Court 
construed as motions to reopen the time to take an appeal 
under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), and which the District Court 
denied because they were filed after the 180-day outer limit 
imposed by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).  Baker asserts that his 
motions to reopen should be considered timely, however, 
because he could not have complied with the 180-day 
requirement as he did not receive the Dismissal Order, and, 
because he moved to reopen within the 180-day window of 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), provided that time lost due to delay 
caused by prison officials is excluded and his time to file his 
motion to reopen runs from the date he received the order.  
We first consider whether we can recognize equitable 
exceptions to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) in light of Baker‟s lack 
of notice, and, if not, then we consider whether we may 
exclude time lost to prison delay under Houston v. Lack in 
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determining whether Baker complied with that Rule‟s 
requirements. 
1.  Requirements to Reopen the Time to Take an     
Appeal 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(1) provides that a notice of appeal 
must be filed within thirty days after the entry of the 
judgment or order appealed from, or within sixty days, when 
one of the parties to the case is the United States.  Fed R. 
App. P. 4(a)(1).  If a party fails to file his notice of appeal 
within the thirty- or sixty-day time limit, Appellate Rule 
4(a)(6) provides a limited opportunity to reopen the time to 
file an appeal when certain conditions are met.  First, the 
district court must find that the party moving to reopen the 
time to file an appeal did not receive notice of the entry of the 
judgment or order sought to be appealed within twenty-one 
days after its entry on the district court docket.  Second, the 
motion to reopen must be “filed within 180 days after the 
judgment or order is entered or within 14 days after the 
moving party receives notice under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is earlier.”  Third, the 
district court must find that no party would be prejudiced.  If 
all of these conditions are met, the district court may reopen 
the time to file an appeal for a period of fourteen days after 
the date when its order to reopen is entered.  Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(6)(A)-(C).  Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) adopts these 
conditions directly from a statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2107.
8
  While 
                                              
8
 Section 2107(c) provides, in pertinent part: 
 
In addition, if the district court finds—  
(1) that a party entitled to notice of the 
entry of a judgment or order did not 
13 
 
according to its plain terms, the rule imposes specific time 
limits within which one may move to reopen the time to file 
an appeal, the question is whether those limits are subject to 
any exceptions, equitable or otherwise, that would allow us to 
relax the rule‟s time limits.   
The Supreme Court answered this question in Bowles 
v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007).  Bowles missed Appellate 
Rule 4(a)(1)‟s thirty-day deadline to file a notice of appeal 
after being denied federal habeas relief by the district court.  
Id. at 207.  When Bowles moved to reopen the time to take an 
appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), the district court granted 
it and gave Bowles seventeen days, rather than the fourteen 
days specified by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) and § 2107(c), to file 
his notice of appeal.  Bowles filed his appeal within the 
seventeen days allowed by the district court‟s order, but after 
the fourteen-day period allowed by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) 
                                                                                                     
receive such notice from the clerk or any 
party within 21 days of its entry, and  
(2) that no party would be prejudiced,  
the district court may, upon motion filed within 
180 days after entry of the judgment or order or 
within 14 days after receipt of such notice, 
whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal 
for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of 
the order reopening the time for appeal.  
 
Like Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), § 2107(c) was amended in 2009 
to change the seven-day requirement to fourteen days.  See 
supra n.4 (noting that at the time Baker filed his motions to 
reopen, the rule required a litigant to so move within the 
earlier of 180 days after the entry of judgment, or seven days 
after the litigant received notice of the judgment). 
14 
 
and § 2107(c) had passed.  Id.  Bowles argued that he should 
be permitted to appeal because he had filed his notice of 
appeal in accordance with the district court‟s order permitting 
him to do so.  See id. at 214.   
The Supreme Court held that the court of appeals 
lacked jurisdiction over Bowles‟s appeal because it was filed 
outside the fourteen-day window allowed by Appellate Rule 
4(a)(6) and § 2107(c).  The Court observed that “the limit on 
how long a district court may reopen th[e] period [for filing 
an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)] is set forth in a 
statute,” and concluded that Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) was a 
jurisdictional rule, not a “simple „claim-processing rule.‟”  Id. 
at 213 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c)).  In so holding, the 
Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic principle that “the taking 
of an appeal within the prescribed time is „mandatory and 
jurisdictional.‟”  Id. at 209 (quoting Griggs v. Provident 
Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982)).  If a party 
fails to comply with the prescribed time limits, a court of 
appeals lacks jurisdiction over his case.   
Continuing its efforts to clarify the difference between 
jurisdictional rules—those which are strictly enforced 
because they control a court‟s subject-matter jurisdiction over 
a case—and claims-processing rules—those which are subject 
to waiver, forfeiture, and equitable exceptions because they 
do not set mandatory rules regarding a court‟s subject-matter 
jurisdiction—the Court distinguished Bowles‟s case from 
other cases involving claims-processing rules.  For example, 
in Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 448 (2004), the Supreme 
Court held that a party‟s failure to comply with the timing 
requirement of Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 4004 
did not deprive a court of subject-matter jurisdiction because, 
in part, that rule did not derive its timing requirement from a 
15 
 
statute.  Rather, Rule 4004 was a procedural claims-
processing rule, which, while important for the orderly 
transaction of business and administration of cases before a 
court, may be subject to waiver or forfeiture if a party waits 
too long to raise the timeliness issue before the court issues a 
decision on the merits.  Id. at 456; see also Eberhart v. United 
States, 546 U.S. 12 (2005) (holding that Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 33(a), which parallels Bankruptcy Rule 
4004, is a claims-processing rule subject to waiver or 
forfeiture).    
The Supreme Court in Bowles was explicit in stating 
that neither Kontrick nor Eberhart “calls into question our 
longstanding treatment of statutory time limits for taking an 
appeal as jurisdictional” such that any failure to comply with 
them would divest a court of subject-matter jurisdiction.  551 
U.S. at 210.
9
  As it explained, § 2107 “contains the type of 
                                              
9
 The Supreme Court‟s suggestion that some time limits have 
jurisdictional force because they are derived from statute has 
led lower courts to emphasize that point in assessing whether 
other rules impose jurisdictional limits or merely give claims-
processing guidance.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1099 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“Whether a federal rule establishing a time 
limitation imposes a jurisdictional rule depends on whether 
the rule derives from a statute.” (citing Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 
452)).  Yet, such a narrow focus is inappropriate, as some 
rules based in statute are not jurisdictional.  See Reed 
Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 130 S. Ct. 1237, 1241 (2010) 
(concluding that statutory rule requiring copyright holders to 
register works before suing was not jurisdictional); Dolan v. 
United States, 130 S. Ct. 2533, 2536 (2010) (holding that the 
16 
 
statutory time constraints that would limit a court‟s 
jurisdiction.”  Id. at 211.  Furthermore, it found this reasoning 
to make “good sense” because Congress possesses the 
authority to decide what cases lower federal courts have the 
power—or jurisdiction—to consider.  Id. at 212.  And 
“[b]ecause Congress decides whether federal courts can hear 
cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what 
conditions, federal courts can hear them.”  Id. at 212-13.   
Based on this reasoning, the Supreme Court concluded 
that § 2107(c), and, thus, Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), set forth 
specific limitations imposed by Congress on a district court‟s 
authority to reopen the time to file an appeal.  Failure to 
comply with those limitations operates to deprive a court of 
appeals of jurisdiction over an appellant‟s appeal.  Id. at 213.  
The district court‟s order permitting Bowles seventeen days 
to file his notice of appeal did not effectively alter the time 
limits because the district court had no authority to create 
equitable exceptions to them.  Id. at 214; see also In re Sealed 
Case (Bowles), 624 F.3d 482, 487 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (declining 
to override the requirements of Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) 
because that rule is mandatory and jurisdictional).  
Accordingly, there is no doubt after Bowles that those rules 
                                                                                                     
district court was able to enter a restitution order even though 
it missed the statutory deadline to do so).  Indeed, the Bowles 
Court did not “hold that all statutory conditions imposing a 
time limit should be considered jurisdictional,” but instead 
looked to context and history to determine “whether a statute 
ranks a requirement as jurisdictional.”  Reed Elsevier, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1247-48.  That said, the Bowles Court expressly stated 
that statutory time limits for taking an appeal are 
jurisdictional.    
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listed in 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which are also embodied in 
Appellate Rules 4(a)(1) and 4(a)(6), are jurisdictional, and are 
not subject to equitable modification.   
Here, the District Court correctly concluded that 
Baker‟s failure to comply with the requirement that his 
motion to reopen be filed within the earlier of 180 days after 
the judgment or order is entered, or within seven days after 
his receipt of notice of the Dismissal Order, was fatal.  Baker 
filed his motion to reopen on May 31, 2007, which was 323 
days after the entry of the Dismissal Order and well beyond 
the 180-day outer limit imposed by Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).
10
  
See 2005 Advisory Committee Notes to Appellate Rule 
4(a)(6) (“[A]n appeal cannot be brought more than 180 days 
after entry, no matter what the circumstances.”); 1991 
Advisory Committee Notes to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) 
(explaining that the rule “establishes an outer time limit of 
180 days for a party who fails to receive timely notice of 
entry of judgment to seek additional time to take appeal”).  
Given Bowles, we cannot extend the 180-day outer limit of 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).   
2.  Excluding Time Lost Due to Prison Delay 
Under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) 
                                              
10
 If a litigant has not heard from a district court, he would do 
well to check on the status of his case a few months after the 
filing of a dispositive motion to ensure that the district court 
has not rendered a decision of which the litigant is unaware, 
given the 180-day outer limit for filing a motion to reopen the 
time to file an appeal.  Unfortunately, Baker did not ask for a 
copy of the Dismissal Order until 206 days after it was 
entered, by which time it was already too late to seek to 
reopen the time to file an appeal.   
18 
 
Nevertheless, Baker urges that if we cannot extend the 
time, we should instead exclude time allegedly attributable to 
delays caused by prison officials in transmitting the Dismissal 
Order.  Under his approach, we would begin counting the 7-
day/180-day requirement from January 7, 2008, the date 
Baker finally received a copy of the Dismissal Order.  In 
order to exclude the time allegedly lost to delay caused by 
prison officials, we would have to read the terms “entry” in § 
2107(c) and “entered” in Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(B) to mean 
when the prisoner receives the entered order, as opposed to 
when the order or judgment is actually entered by the clerk on 
the docket.  Baker asserts that reading the statute and the rule 
in this way is not only permissible, but is required by the 
Supreme Court‟s decision in Houston v. Lack, as well as our 
decisions in United States v. Grana, 864 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 
1989) and United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282 (3d Cir. 
2003), all cases in which the courts have fashioned ways to 
take into account the potential delays caused by prison 
officials that pro se prisoners may confront, while also 
enforcing the time limits of Appellate Rule 4(a).  If we were 
to read the Appellate Rule and the statute in this way, and 
agree that the delay was caused by prison officials, Baker‟s 
motion to reopen would have complied with the conditions of 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(6).   
Houston teaches that we can, in some instances, read a 
statute to take into account delays that pro se prisoners face.  
But any such reading must not run contrary to the other terms 
of the statute.  The statute involved in that case, 28 U.S.C. § 
2107(a), provides:  
[N]o appeal shall bring any judgment, order, or 
decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil 
nature before a court of appeals for review 
19 
 
unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty 
days after the entry of such judgment, order or 
decree. 
(emphasis added).  Appellate Rule 4(a)(1)(A), which requires 
a party to file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the entry 
of the judgment or order appealed from, derives from § 
2107(a).  The Supreme Court held that a pro se prisoner‟s 
notice of appeal should be deemed filed, under § 2107(a) and 
the Appellate Rule, when he delivers it to prison authorities 
for forwarding to the district court.  487 U.S. at 270.  This 
prison mailbox rule, the Court reasoned, was necessary in 
order to accommodate the unique circumstances pro se 
prisoners face in having to entrust the forwarding of their 
filings to prison authorities and in being unable to guard 
against any delays caused by prison officials in transmitting 
their filings to the relevant court.  Id. at 271.  The rule of 
Houston thus excludes from the time to file a notice of appeal 
any time lost to delays caused by prison authorities in 
transmitting the pro se prisoner‟s notice of appeal to the 
district court.   
In so holding, the Court expressly considered whether 
the language of § 2107 permitted it to deem a notice of appeal 
filed when the pro se prisoner hands it over to prison 
authorities.  The Court noted that the statute: 
does not define when a notice of appeal has 
been “filed” or designate the person with whom 
it must be filed, and nothing in the statute 
suggests that, in the unique circumstances of a 
pro se prisoner, it would be inappropriate to 
conclude that a notice of appeal is “filed” within 
the meaning of  § 2107 at the moment it is 
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delivered to prison officials for forwarding to 
the clerk of the district court. 
487 U.S. at 272.  Thus, the Supreme Court fashioned a way to 
take into account “the unique circumstances of a pro se 
prisoner,” while also preserving the mandatory and 
jurisdictional nature of the timing requirements to file a notice 
of appeal.  Id. 
 However, unlike Houston‟s reading of § 2107(a) to 
allow “filed” to be interpreted expansively, we conclude that 
we cannot read “entry” within the meaning of § 2107(c) in a 
way that both takes into account potential delays caused by 
prison officials while also preserving the mandatory and 
jurisdictional nature of the statute as Bowles requires.  First, 
the Appellate Rules provide that an order is “entered” when it 
is actually added to the civil docket.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(7).  If we were to read “entry” expansively to mean the 
date Baker received the Dismissal Order, we would be 
redefining the meaning of entry, contrary to the definition 
provided in Appellate Rule 4(a)(7).  In contrast, in Houston, 
the Court noted that the Appellate Rules did not foreclose its 
reading of “filed,” for they were silent on the question of 
when a notice of appeal is actually filed.  487 U.S. at 273. 
More significantly, § 2107(c) provides that if the 
district court finds that a party did not receive notice of the 
entry of a judgment within twenty-one days of its entry, and 
that no party would be prejudiced, it: 
may, upon motion filed within 180 days after 
the entry of the judgment or order or within 14 
days after receipt of such notice, whichever is 
earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period 
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of 14 days from the date of entry of the order 
reopening the time for appeal. 
(emphasis added).
11
  Under its plain language, a party may 
move to reopen the time to file an appeal within the earlier of:  
(1) 180 days after the entry of judgment, or (2) 14 days after 
receiving notice of the entry of the judgment.  If we were to 
read “entry” expansively to mean the date Baker received the 
Dismissal Order, we would then be modifying § 2107(c) so as 
to instead provide that “the district court may, upon motion 
filed within 180 days after the receipt of the judgment or 
order (substituted for “entry”) or within 14 days after receipt 
of such notice, whichever is earlier . . . .”12  This reading is 
unworkable because it sets forth two different time limits 
from the notice of the order and would eviscerate the 180-day 
outer time limit.  No pro se prisoner would ever run up 
against that limit because the earlier of the two situations 
listed above would always be fourteen days after receipt of 
notice of the order, and no pro se prisoner would ever reach 
                                              
11
 Similarly, Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(B) provides that in order 
to reopen the time to take an appeal, “the motion [must be] 
filed within 180 days after the judgment or order is entered or 
within 14 days after the moving party receives notice under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever 
is earlier.”  (emphasis added).  
 
12
 Likewise, if we read “entered” in Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(B) 
to mean when Baker received the Dismissal Order, the rule 
would then read “the motion [must be] filed within 180 days 
after notice of the judgment or order is received or within 14 
days after the moving party receives notice under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 77(d) of the entry, whichever is 
earlier.”    
22 
 
180 days before the 14-day period expired.  Thus, as to pro se 
prisoners, this reading would completely eliminate an entire 
clause of § 2107(c), namely, “within 180 days after the entry 
of the judgment or order,” and would place no outer limit 
whatsoever on the filing of motions to reopen.  In light of 
Bowles‟s reminder that Congress has the authority to 
determine under what circumstances a federal court may hear 
a case, see 551 U.S. at 212-13, we cannot endorse a reading 
of § 2107(c) that completely nullifies the 180-day outer limit 
on the time for a litigant—whether a pro se prisoner or not—
to take an appeal; doing so would run contrary to Congress‟s 
plain intent, apparent in § 2107(c), to set a 180-day outer limit 
on when a litigant may move to reopen the time to file a 
notice of appeal.  See also 2005 Advisory Committee Notes 
to Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) (“[A]n appeal cannot be brought 
more than 180 days after entry, no matter what the 
circumstances.”). 
 Thus, unlike in Houston, where nothing in § 2107(a) or 
the Appellate Rules foreclosed the reading of “filed” that the 
Supreme Court adopted, here, the plain language and clear 
intent of § 2107(c) forecloses the reading Baker suggests.  
Indeed, § 2107(c) concerns itself with the potential for delay 
in receiving notice of the entry; the point of the 180-day outer 
limit is because there could be delayed notice.  This limit is 
there for a reason and is not superfluous.  We cannot endorse 
an interpretation that effectively deletes it from the statute. 
Nothing in our previous decisions in Grana or Fiorelli 
requires us to read § 2107(c) as Baker suggests.  In Grana, 
we held that delay by prison authorities in delivering mail to a 
prisoner should be excluded when calculating the time for 
filing a notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 4(b) in a 
criminal case.  864 F.2d at 313.  Relying on the Supreme 
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Court‟s holding in Houston, we “perceive[d] no difference 
between delay in transmitting the prisoner‟s papers to the 
court and transmitting the court‟s final judgment to him so 
that he may prepare his appeal.”  Id. at 316.  This conclusion 
is supportable in Grana in part because Appellate Rule 4(b) is 
not based on a statute.
13
  There was no controlling statute in 
Grana, but § 2107(c) is controlling here.   
Fiorelli speaks to when tolling a litigant‟s time to file a 
notice of appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is 
appropriate, not whether requirements in moving to reopen 
the time to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) are 
met.  As we discuss further below, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) 
provides that a litigant‟s time to take an appeal is tolled by the 
filing of certain timely post-judgment motions, including 
motions for reconsideration.  In Fiorelli, we held that “a 
prison‟s actual delay or interference in the delivery of a final 
order of the district court is excluded from the calculation of 
the timeliness of motions for reconsideration . . . filed by pro 
se inmates.”  337 F.3d at 289-90.  The effect of this holding is 
that when a motion for reconsideration is, after excluding 
time lost due to prison delay, timely, a pro se prisoner‟s time 
to file a notice of appeal is tolled under Appellate Rule 
                                              
13
 When Grana was decided, it was generally understood that 
“the failure to file a timely notice of appeal in a criminal case 
deprives [the court] of appellate jurisdiction.”  Virgin Islands 
v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 326 (3d Cir. 2010); see id. at 326-
27 (collecting authority and citing Grana in support of the 
“prior jurisdictional view of [Appellate] Rule 4(b)”).  Now, 
however, Appellate Rule 4(b)‟s deadline for filing a notice of 
appeal in a criminal case is considered a “rigid” claims-
processing rule.  Id. at 329. 
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4(a)(4)(A).  Reading “timely” in Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) to 
exclude time that is actually attributable to delays caused by 
prison officials for purposes of tolling is permissible, because 
nothing in a statute or the Appellate Rules forecloses it.  
Indeed, unlike Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), which is based in a 
statute, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is not.
14
  Notably, in the 
companion case of Long v. Atlantic City Police Department, 
filed today, we have held that Fiorelli is still controlling 
precedent.  See --- F.3d ---, No. 06-4732, slip op. at 15 (3d 
Cir.  Feb. 10, 2012). 
                                              
14
 Whether Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is a claims-processing 
rule is a question we need not answer here.  Even though our 
holding in Lizardo v. United States, 619 F.3d 273, 277 (3d 
Cir. 2010), implies that Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) is a claims-
processing rule because its provisions do not appear in a 
statute and it was promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act, 
that does not mean that it is not binding or lacks force.  But 
see Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. ---, slip op. at 12 (2012) 
(noting that Appellate Rule 4 is treated “„as a single 
jurisdictional threshold‟” (quoting Torres v. Oakland 
Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 315 (1988))).  To the contrary, 
we stated in Long that “a conclusion that Appellate Rule 
4(a)(4)(A) is a claims-processing rule would not prevent us 
from dismissing, sua sponte, untimely appeals filed under 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).”  Long, slip op. at 19 n.18.  
Indeed, although a rule may be claims-processing in nature, a 
court can still strictly enforce timing requirements contained 
in that rule.  See, e.g., Gonzalez, slip op. at 10 (“[C]alling a 
rule nonjurisdictional does not mean that it is not mandatory . 
. . .”); United States v. Mitchell, 518 F.3d 750 (10th Cir. 
2008) (holding that the court had the power to enforce claims-
processing rules by way of a sua sponte dismissal).   
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Therefore, while there are certain instances in which 
we can exclude time lost due to prison delay in calculating the 
timeliness of appeals, the situation presented by Baker‟s case 
is not one of them.  If we were to read “entry” expansively so 
as to permit the exclusion of time lost due to prison delay, we 
would completely eviscerate the plain language of § 2107(c) 
and Appellate Rule 4(a)(6)(B), both of which set a clear 180-
day outer limit on a motion to reopen.  Therefore, the District 
Court was correct in denying Baker‟s motions to reopen the 
time to take an appeal. 
B.  Tolling the Time to File an Appeal Under 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) 
As an alternative to reopening, Baker urges that the 
Dismissal Order is actually before us because his Rule 59(e) 
motion should be deemed timely, such that it would toll his 
time to take an appeal under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).  As 
we noted above, Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A) provides, in 
pertinent part, that certain “timely file[d]” post-judgment 
motions, including motions to reconsider under Rule 59(e), 
serve to postpone “the time to file an appeal . . . until the 
entry of the order disposing of the last . . . remaining motion.”  
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A).
15
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 Our amicus has argued that giving Appellate Rule 
4(a)(4)(A) that effect in this case would run afoul of 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(6), because Baker filed his Rule 59(e) 
motion after the 180-day period for file a motion to reopen 
had lapsed.  Based on the facts presented here, however, we 
need not, and do not, consider or decide how Appellate Rules 
4(a)(4) and 4(a)(6) may interact. 
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Although Baker acknowledges that his Rule 59(e) 
motion was untimely, he asks us to treat it as timely by 
excluding the time lost allegedly due to prison delay, as was 
permitted by Fiorelli and reinforced today in Long v. Atlantic 
City Police Department.  Relying on our decisions in Grana 
and Fiorelli, we concluded in Long that a Rule 59(e) motion 
may be deemed timely when a pro se prisoner alleges, and the 
record shows, that prison officials actually delayed or 
interfered with the delivery of a final order of the district 
court.  See Long, slip op. at 15.  As we further explained in 
Long, 
when a pro se prisoner makes allegations in 
connection with a motion for reconsideration 
that could reasonably be construed as a non-
frivolous assertion that the prison delayed 
delivering the court order that he is asking to be 
reconsidered, the district court should engage in 
fact-finding necessary to a jurisdictional 
analysis under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A). 
Id. at 15-16.  This fact-finding by a district court is critical, 
for it determines the scope of our jurisdiction.
16
 
                                              
16
 Though critical, the kind of fact-finding that a district court 
must undertake need not be extensive.  As we explained in 
Long, “when the prisoner‟s allegations are uncontested, the 
district court may of course choose to credit what the prisoner 
says . . . We then, in turn, would accept any fact-finding as 
long as it was not clearly erroneous.”  Long, slip op. at 16-17.  
Even if the district court cannot conclude on the basis of the 
facts before it “whether the prison actually delayed or 
interfered with a prisoner‟s receipt of an order,” a hearing 
may not be necessary.  Id. at 17. 
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 In Baker‟s case, the District Court did not explicitly 
find any facts that indicate whether Baker‟s allegation that 
prison officials mishandled the delivery of his mail was true.  
In accord with our holding in Fiorelli and as affirmed in our 
holding in Long, therefore, we would ordinarily remand to the 
District Court to find those facts.  See id. at 18.  However, as 
our opinion in Poole suggested and in Long makes clear, 
where the delay is caused not by prison officials but by the 
clerk‟s office, we cannot exclude that time when calculating 
the timeliness of a pro se prisoner‟s filing.   
 In Poole, a civil case, we noted that the delay that 
Poole complained of was “not primarily due to Poole‟s status 
as an inmate but to the simple fact that he was moved.”  368 
F.3d at 266 n.4.  Poole was transferred from one prison 
facility to another shortly before the order that he sought to 
appeal was issued.  The clerk‟s office sent a copy of that 
order to his first prison, but when it arrived, Poole had already 
been transferred to the second prison.  Id. at 264.  By the time 
Poole received a copy of the order, his time to appeal had run.  
We reasoned in Long that the cause of the complained-of 
delay matters and may determine whether we exclude the 
time lost as a result of that delay when calculating a litigant‟s 
compliance with timing requirements.  Long, slip op. at 14.
17
  
                                                                                                     
 
17
 In Poole, we based our reasoning that prison delay was 
cognizable in criminal but not civil cases in part on the fact 
that there was no criminal analogue to Rule 77(d), which 
provides that “„lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does 
not affect the time to appeal.‟”  Poole, 368 F.3d at 266 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d)).  That is incorrect.  See Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 49(c).  However, the remainder of Poole‟s reasoning 
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Thus, where, as in Poole, the delay is caused by the clerk‟s 
office, the rule of Fiorelli and Grana does not apply.  Cf. 
Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 289 (“Grana makes clear that only 
delays caused by the prison warrant tolling of the filing 
deadlines, and „[t]o the extent that the delay represents slow 
mail, there is nothing that this Court can do to preserve an 
appellant‟s right to appellate review.‟” (emphasis added) 
(quoting Grana, 864 F.2d at 316)).          
Accordingly, we will not remand to the District Court 
here because we can conclude from facts already contained in 
the record that the delay of which Baker complains was not 
due to prison officials, but rather, due to error in the clerk‟s 
office.  Baker contends that the prison officials at USP-
Lewisburg erroneously returned the Dismissal Order to the 
District Court, rather than giving it to him.  He supported this 
assertion by pointing to the staff notes on the docket sheet 
indicating “Order dated 7/11/06 returned from Darryl Orrin 
Baker; envelope marked „Not at this address; Return to 
Sender.”  But Baker is incorrect in asserting that the clerk‟s 
office sent the Dismissal Order to USP-Lewisburg.  Rather, it 
is evident that the clerk‟s office erred by sending the order to 
FCI-Lisbon when he was no longer there, and by failing to 
docket Baker‟s change-of-address letter and forwarding the 
Dismissal Order to USP-Lewisburg where he was then 
housed.   
Baker‟s belief that prison officials at USP-Lewisburg 
erroneously returned the order to the District Court was 
                                                                                                     
is sound, because as we noted in Long, “we view the holding 
in Poole as turning not on its distinction between criminal and 
civil cases but rather on the nature of the alleged delay.”  
Long, slip op. at 14.   
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reasonable.  After all, Baker had sent his change-of-address 
letter seven months before the District Court issued the 
Dismissal Order.  Baker lodged a complaint with the prison 
mailroom staff at USP-Lewisburg in February 2007, claiming 
that they returned his mail to the District Court.  A prison 
mailroom staff member responded to his complaint in writing.  
He explained that the mail Baker alleged was returned could 
not have been returned by USP-Lewisburg staff because 
mailroom staff do not use a stamp stating “Not at this address; 
Return to Sender.” 
However, from this response, coupled with the docket 
sheet, we know that the Dismissal Order was sent to FCI-
Lisbon, not to USP-Lewisburg.  At the time the Dismissal 
Order was issued, the docket incorrectly listed Baker‟s 
current address to be at FCI-Lisbon.  Taken together, it is 
clear that the clerk‟s office erred by mailing the Dismissal 
Order to FCI-Lisbon instead of USP-Lewisburg.  Indeed, 
Baker conceded as much in another federal case that he 
brought against prison officials.
18
  It also erred by failing to 
docket Baker‟s change-of-address letter and forwarding the 
Dismissal Order to him there.   
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 In that case, Baker sought relief based on USP-Lewisburg‟s 
alleged interference with Baker‟s appeal rights in this case, 
and conceded that the clerk mailed the Dismissal Order to 
FCI-Lisbon.  See Baker v. Williamson, No. 07-2220, 2010 
WL 1816656, at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 5, 2010).  The District 
Court rejected Baker‟s claim that USP-Lewisburg interfered 
with delivery of the Dismissal Order, and we affirmed.  See 
Baker v. Williamson, No. 11-1824, 2011 WL 6016931 (3d 
Cir. Dec. 5, 2011).   
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Because Baker‟s motion for reconsideration was 
untimely, and that untimeliness cannot be attributed to delays 
caused by prison officials, we cannot deem his motion for 
reconsideration to have been timely filed for purposes of 
tolling under Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A).  We recognize that 
this conclusion works an unfortunate result for Baker.  The 
result is distressing, given that the clerk‟s office seriously 
erred in failing to update Baker‟s address of record until more 
than a year had passed from when he notified the District 
Court of his move.  But as the record before us shows, the 
delay in receiving notice of the Dismissal Order is not due to 
prison delay, but rather, due to clerk error, which does not 
trigger the rule of Fiorelli and Long.
19
   
Although we do not have jurisdiction over the 
Dismissal Order, we do have jurisdiction over the District 
Court‟s orders denying Baker‟s motions for reconsideration 
because Baker filed a timely notice of appeal as to those 
orders.  The District Court properly denied Baker‟s motions 
for reconsideration because as the District Court concluded 
and we agree, they were untimely; the District Court was 
                                              
19
 In the mine run of cases, either Appellate Rule 4(a)(6) will 
be available to allow reopening the time to file an appeal or 
Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) will be available to allow an extension 
of time to file an appeal when a litigant—whether a pro se 
prisoner or not—has not received notice of the appealable 
order in a timely fashion.  Indeed, these Rules should be 
available regardless of whether the delay is attributable to 
clerk‟s office error or prison official error, because in the 
normal case, notice will be received, even if somewhat 
delayed, less than 180 days after the entry of the order sought 
to be appealed.   
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clearly entitled to enforce the timing requirements of Rule 59.  
See supra note 14.  Also, the District Court did not err in 
concluding that it need not hold an evidentiary hearing to 
determine whether prison delay caused Baker to receive the 
Dismissal Order late.  Although the District Court based its 
decision on the reasoning of Poole that we have found to be 
incorrect, see supra note 17, the ultimate ruling was correct 
because the available evidence conclusively shows that the 
delay was not caused by prison officials.  Accordingly, fact-
finding under Fiorelli is unnecessary.   
III.  Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court. 
 
